The First Path

The first path would have been to adopt a passive attitudetowards the future, and to be content with the part which he hadplayed in leading and directing the da'wah during his lifetime,leaving its future to circumstance and chance.It is of course unthinkable to attribute such passivity to theProphet because it grows from two different possibilities,neitherof which can be levelled against the Prophet. The first possibilityis the belief that such passivity and disregard would have noeffect upon the future of the da'wah, and that the Ummah whichwould follow his da'wah would be capable of acting independentlyin a manner which would protect the da'wah and ensure itagainst deviation.But this belief is totally indefensible, and indeed the essentialnature of things would seem to indicate the opposite, becausethe da'wah was by its very nature a radical and transformatoryfactor, which aimed at building a new community from whichall jahili principles would be removed. It was, however, alsoprone to dangerous possibilities when deprived of its leader andof all guidance. And such perils were sure to arise if noallowances were made for the vacuum left by the Prophet'sdeath, which would leave the Ummah without any guidance,and from the subsequent needs of the Ummah to adopt anextemporaneous attitude in the shadow of the massive difficultiesposed by the death of the Prophet. Had the Prophet left theUmmah without any guidance regarding the development ofIslam, it would have had to face the problem of conducting itselfwithout its leader while facing the most dangerous issues ever toconfront Islam without possessing any prior experience thereof.Such a state of affairs would also have required that the Ummahadopt an immediate policy as to how to conduct itself in spite ofthe danger posed by the problem, because the vacuum could notbe allowed to continue.

And this speedily-arranged policy wouldhave had to be instituted just when the Ummah was suffering thestaggering shock of losing its Great Leader. This shock mustobviously have shaken the foundations of logical thought andexacerbated any disorders, and it was perhaps this shock thatforced one of the sahaba to announce that the Prophet had notdied and would not die.

These are the dangers which might have arisen from anyreligious immaturity on the part of the sahaba, who had not yetattained the standard at which the Prophet could feel satisfied,of a reasonable reaction to the khilafah after his death, withinthe religious framework of Islam, and of their ability toovercome the hidden contradictions which existed, and con-tinued to exist, in the minds of the Muslims, regarding theirdivisions into the Muhajirun and Ansar, Quraysh and the rest ofthe Arab tribes of Makkah and Medina.There are also the dangers which arose from the existence ofanonymous factions within the Ummah who acted treacherouslyfrom the time of the Prophet onwards. This is the faction whichthe Qur'an calls the munafiqun (hypocrites).

When we add tothem the large numbers who converted to Islam after theconquests, becoming Muslims for material gains and not out ofspiritual awakening, we can begin to assess the danger posed bythese groups, who would find a chance to grow and expand inthe vast vacuum which would result from the absence of theguiding leadership.Obviously the acceptance of such a perilous position after hisdeath could not be envisaged by any ideological leader, let aloneby the Seal of the Prophets.Indeed Abu Bakr was loathe to leave the arena without ensuringa positive future for the government by the appointment of onewho could fully comprehend and control its affairs...Similarly, the people rushed to Umar when he was struck downsaying: '0 Leader of the Faithful, if you would only set out acovenant," ( 1 ) fearing the vacuum of authority which the khalifahwould leave behind him, in spite of the political and socialconcentration which the da'wah had attained during the 10 yearsfollowing the death of the Prophet.

And Umar designated sixpeople to calm their fears. Umar recognized the extent of thedanger posed by the circumstances of as-Saqifa, and the possiblecomplications which might have arisen from the improvisednature of the khilafah of Abu Bakr, when he said: 'Theappointment (ba'yah) of Abu Bakr would have been a fatalmistake had Allah not protected us from its evil.' ( 2 )

Abu Bakr himself regretted the speed with which he hadaccepted authority and taken over its difficult problems,although he had sensed the danger of the situation and thenecessity for a quick solution, when he said, when blamed foraccepting the authority: 'Indeed the Messenger of Allah haddied and the people had only just emerged from jahiliyyah.

So Ifeared that they would be subject to temptations, and myassociates encouraged me therein.' ( 3 ) if all this is true then it must also be evident that the Pioneer andthe Prophet of Islam felt the danger of a negative attitude moreacutely, and understood the exact nature of the situation andneeds of the task of radical transformation, which he hadinstigated in the Ummah so newly emerged from jahiliyyah,more profoundly than Abu Bakr.

The second possibility which could explain the passivity of theLeader towards the future and progress of Islam after his deathis that he did not seek to protect Islam from this peril, althoughaware of the great danger posed by such a stance, because heviewed Islam advantageously and was only interested inprotecting it during his lifetime, so that he could receive benefitsand gains from it while uninvolved in its future protection afterhis death.This explanation is unthinkable in the case of the Prophet, oreven if we do not regard him as a Prophet, closely involved withAllah, May He be Praised and Exalted, in every aspect of Islam,and simply consider him as a leader passionately committed tohis cause similar to any other.

We cannot cite any example of atotally devoted leader who sacrificed himself in the interests ofIslam as did the Prophet until the last moment of his life. In facthis whole career proves this point, and even when on hisdeathbed and suffering greatly from his illness he was deeplyconcerned with a campaign which he had planned, and the forcewhich he had dispatched under Usama, and ordered themsaying: 'Stand ready with Usama's forces! Convoke the forces ofUsama! Send out Usama's contingents!' He repeated thisalthough losing consciousness from time to time.( 4 )

For indeedthe concern of the Prophet regarding this military campaignalone was so profound that he expended all his efforts upon iteven on his deathbed, and although he knew that he would diebefore he could reap the rewards of this campaign, he did notallow this to interfere with his task even until his last breath.

Sohow can we even consider the opinion that the Prophet wasneither preoccupied with the future of Islam, nor planningagainst the expected dangers which would confront its safetyafter his death?Finally, during the lifetime of the Prophet there is one act whichis itself sufficient to negate the first assumption, while alsoproving that the Prophet was by no means passive towards thefuture of Islam, nor unaware of the dangers therein or unconcernedthereby. Furthermore, this act has been related in theauthentic works of both the Sunni and Shi'a Muslims.

It is thatUmar al-Khattab was amongst a group of men in the housewhen the Prophet, who was about to die, said: 'Bring meparchment and pen so that I may write something for you afterwhich you shall never go astray.'( 5)

In fact this act of the Prophet, which is generally viewed asauthentic, illustrates clearly that he was deeply concerned aboutthe dangers which had to be faced in the future, and recognizedthe need to plan ahead so as to protect the Ummah fromdeviation, and save it from inattentiveness and disintegration. Itis thus totally impossible to substantiate any claim of passivitylevelled against the Prophet.