IV. Shaban & His New Interpretation

Among the latest work by the western scholarship on the historyof Islam is M A Shaban's Islamic History AD 600-750, subtitled'A New Interpretation,' in which the author claims not only touse newly discovered material but also to reexamine andreinterpret material which has been known to us for manydecades. Shaban, a lecturer of Arabic at SOAS of the Universityof London, is not prepared to even consider the event of GhadirKhum. He writes: 'The famous Shi'ite tradition that he [theProphet] designated Ali as his successor at Ghadir Khumshould not be taken seriously.' Shaban gives two 'new' reasonsfor not taking the event of Ghadir seriously:'Such an event is inherently improbable considering the Arabs'reluctance to entrust young untried men with great responsibility.Furthermore, at no point do our sources show the Madinancommunity behaving as if they had heard of this designation.' ( 16)

Let us critically examine each of these reasons given by Shaban.(1) The traditional reluctance of the Arabs to entrust youngmen with great responsibility. First of all, had not the Prophetintroduced many things to which the Arabs were traditionallyreluctant? Was not Islam itself accepted by the Makkans veryreluctantly? This 'traditional reluctance,' instead of being anargument against the appointment of Ali, is actually part of theargument used by the Shi'as. They agree that the Arabs werereluctant to accept Imam Ali as the Prophet's successor not onlybecause of his young age but also because he had killed theirleaders in the battles of Islam. According to the Shi'as, Allahalso mentions this reluctance when after ordering the Prophet toproclaim Imam Ali as his successor ('0 Messenger! Conveywhat had been revealed to you...'), He reassured His Messengerby saying that 'Allah will protect you from the people' (5:67).The Prophet was commissioned to convey the message of Allah,no matter whether the Arabs liked it or not.Moreover, this 'traditional reluctance' was not an irrevocablecustom of the Arab society as Shaban wants us to believe. Jafry,in The Origin and Early Development of Shi'a Islam, says: 'Oursources do not fail to point out that, though the 'Senate'(Nadwa) of pre-Islamic Makkah was generally a council ofelders only, the sons of the chieftain Qusayy were privileged tobe exempted from this age restriction and were admitted to thecouncil despite their youth. In later times, more liberalconcessions seem to have been in vogue; Abu Jahl was admitteddespite his youth, and Hakim ibn Hazm was admitted when hewas only 15 or 20 years old.' Then Jafry quotes Ibn 'AbdRabbih: 'There was no monarchic king over the Arabs ofMakkah in the jahiliyyah. So whenever there was a war, theytook a ballot among chieftains and elected one as 'King,' werehe a minor or a grown man. Thus on the day of Fijar, it was theturn of Banu Hashim, and as a result of the ballot Al-Abbas,who was then a mere child, was elected, and they seated him onthe shield.' ( 17)

Thirdly, we have an example in the Prophet's own decisionsduring the last days of his life when he entrusted the commandof the army to Usama ibn Zayd, a young man who was hardly20 years of age. ( 18)

He was appointed over the elders of theMuhajirun and the Ansar, and, indeed, many of the eldersresented this decision of the Prophet. ( 19)

If the Prophet of Islamcould appoint the young and untried Usama ibn Zayd over theelders of the Muhajirun, then why should it be 'inherentlyinprobable' to think that the Prophet had appointed Imam Alias his successor?(2) The traditional reluctance to entrust tried men with greatresponsibility. Apart from the young age of Imam Ali, Shabanalso refers to the reluctance of the Arabs in entrusting 'untriedmen with great responsibility.' This implies that Abu Bakr wasselected by the Arabs because he had been 'tried with greatresponsibilities.' I doubt whether Shaban would be able tosubstantiate the implication of his claim from Islamic history.One will find more instances where Imam Ali was entrusted bythe Prophet with greater responsibilities than Abu Bakr. ImamAli was left behind in Makkah during the Prophet's migrationto mislead the enemies and also to return the properties ofvarious people which were given in trust to the Prophet. ImamAli was tried with greater responsibilities during the early battlesof Islam in which he was always successful. When the declaration(bara'at) against the pagan Arabs of Makkah was revealed, firstAbu Bakr was entrusted to convey it to the Makkans, but lateron this great responsibility was taken away from him andentrusted to Imam Ali. Imam Ali was entrusted with the cityand citizens of Medina while the Prophet had gone on theexpedition to Tabuk. Imam Ali was appointed the leader of theexpedition to Yemen. These are just a few examples which cometo mind at random. Therefore, on a comparative level, Ali ibnAbi Talib was a person who had been tried and entrusted withgreater responsibilities than Abu Bakr.(3) The behaviour of the Medinan community about thedeclaration of Ghadir. Firstly, if an event can be proved as trueby the accepted academic standards (of the Sunnis, of course),then the reaction of the people to that event is immaterial.Secondly, the same 'traditional reluctance' used by Shaban todiscredit the declaration of Ghadir can be used here against hisscepticism towards the event of Ghadir. This traditionalreluctance, besides other factors which are beyond the scope ofthis paper, ( 20)

can be used to explain the behaviour of theMedinan community.Thirdly, although the Medinan community was silent during theevents which kept Imam Ali away from the khilafah, there weremany among them who had witnessed the declaration of GhadirKhum. On quite a few occasions, Imam Ali implored the sahabaof the Prophet to bear witness to the declaration of Ghadir.Here I will just mention one instance which took place in Kufaduring the khilafah of Imam Ali, 24 years after the Prophet'sdeath.Imam Ali heard that some people were doubting his claim ofprecedency over the previous khulafah, therefore, he came to agathering at the mosque and implored the eyewitnesses of theevent of Ghadir Khum to verify the truth of the Prophet'sdeclaration about his being the lord and master of all thebelievers. Many sahaba of the Prophet stood up and verified theclaim of Imam Ali. We have the names of 24 of those whotestified on behalf of Imam Ali, although other sources like theMusnad of Ibn Hanbal and Majma' as-Zawa'id of Hafiz al-Haythami  put that number at 30. Also bear in mind that thisincident took place 25 years after the event of Ghadir Khum,and during this period hundreds of eyewitnesses had diednaturally or in the battles fought during the first two khulafah'srule. Add to this the fact that this incident took place in Kufawhich was far from the centre of the sahabas, Medina. Thisincident which took place in Kufa in the year 35 A.H. has itselfbeen narrated by four sahaba and 14 tabi'un and has beenrecorded in most books of history and tradition. ( 21)

In conclusion, the behaviour of the Medinan community afterthe death of the Prophet does not automatically make thedeclaration of Ghadir Khum improbable. I think this will sufficeto make Shaban realize that his is not a 'new' intepretation;rather it exemplifies, in my view, the first stage of the classicalresponse of the Sunni polemicists -- an outright denial of theexistence of an event or a hadith which supports the Shi'i views-- which has been absorbed by the majority of the westernscholars of Islam.


16- M A Shaban, Islamic History AD 600-750, Cambridge: University Press, 1971, p 16.   

17- S H M  Jafry, The Origin and Early Development of Shi'a Islam, Qum: Ansariyan Publications, n.d., p 22.

18- 'M H Haykal, The life of Muhammad, tr Al-Faruqi (n.p., American Trust Publications, 1976, p 492.

19- See the Tabaqat of Ibn Sa'd and other major works on seerah.

20- For more details, see S S A  Rizvi, Imamate, Tehran: WOFIS,1985, pp 120-121.

21- For full references, see Al-Amini, Al-Ghadir vol 1, Tehran: Mu'assatul Muwahhidi, 1976, pp 166-186.