The Second Path
The second path is that the Prophet adopted a positive policy
concerning the future of Islam after his death and planned
towards it by advocating the appointment of a shura (counsel)
which would be responsible for the affairs of Islam and leading
the Ummah. This shura would be composed of the first
generation of the faithful, the Muhajirun and the Ansar, who
would represent the Ummah, while formulating the foundations
for the future government and for the leadership of Islam as it
evolved further.
It is obvious, however, that the nature of things and the actual
events which took place concerning the Prophet, the da'wah and
the faithful refute this hypothesis and disprove the claim that the
Prophet followed this method and sought to invest the leadership
of Islam immediately after his death to the Ummah as represented
in a shura composed of the initial generation of the Muhajirun
and the Ansar.
We shall now examine some of the points which clarify this.
1. Had the Prophet adopted a positive attitude towards the
future of the da'wah and intended that a shura be set up
immediately after his death and that the leadership of the da'wah
be handed over to someone elected according to this principle,
he would have found it absolutely necessary to educate the
Ummah and the faithful concerning the principles of shura with
its rules and details, and to give it a form which reflected the
divine and holy sanction, while also preparing the Islamic
society both mentally and spiritually to accept this system. This
would have been vital because the Islamic society grew from a
confederacy of clans which had not functioned according to the
political principles of shura before Islam, but had in fact
( 15 )
generally functioned according to tribal leadership, in which
power, wealth and the principles of inheritance had a large part
to play.
We can easily discover that the Prophet did not seek to educate
his followers concerning the principles, legal details and
theoretical concepts of shura, because such a policy, had it been
carried out, would surely have been reflected and embodied in
the ahadith transmitted from the Prophet, or in the mentality of
the Ummah, at least as far as the earliest generation is concerned
the Muhajirun and the Ansar - who would have been obliged
to implement the organization of the shura. We do not,
however, find any clearly defined legal evidence from the
organization of a shura in the prophetical ahadith. As for the
mentality of the Ummah or of the earliest generation thereof we
can find no discernible reflection of any attempt to educate them
to accept this.
Indeed this generation subscribed to two different trends: the
first is led by the Ahl al-Bayt (the People of the House of the
Prophet), while the other is exemplified by those present at
as-Saqifa and the khalifah who only arose after the death of the
Prophet. The first trend was composed of those who believed in
the wisaya and imama, and there is no reflection of any belief in
the concept of shura amongst them. As for those who subscribed
to the second trend, all the proofs and arguments which
occurred during their lifetime and during their careers undoubtedly indicate that they neither believed in shura nor established their careers according to it, and the same is true of the rest of the groups who were alive at the time of the Prophet's death.
The following narrative proves this: when Abu Bakr's illness
became acute he appointed Umar ibn al-Khattab and ordered
Uthman to write down the pledge. So he wrote:
'In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate. This is
the pledge of Abu Bakr, the khalifah of the Messenger of Allah,
( 16 )
to the believers and Muslims. Peace be upon you, and I extol
Allah to you. I hereby appoint Umar ibn al-Khattab as your
liege. So hear and obey!' Then 'Abd ar-Rahman ibn Awf came
to him and said: 'How are you this morning, 0 khalifah of the
Prophet of Allah?' So he replied: `I am dying, and you have
aggravated my condition because I appointed one of you and
you have all become upset, as you all aspire to this office
yourselves!'6
It is clear from the appointment of this khalifah and from the
disapproval of the opposition that Abu Bakr did not consider
the establishment of a shura but believed that he had the right to
stipulate the next khalifah and that this situation obliged
obedience on the part of the Muslims. For this reason he
ordered them to hear and obey, and did not simply nominate
Umar, but obliged them to accept his stipulation.
We should also point out that Umar himself believed that he
had the right to appoint a khalifah to rule over the Muslims, and
appointed a group of six people and charged them with
choosing his successor from amongst themselves, without any
reference to the rights of the rest of the Muslims in this election.
Thus the rationale of the function of a shura was not exemplified
in Umar's appointment of a khalifah to succeed him, just as it
had not been exemplified in the method employed by the first khalifah. Indeed, when the people asked Umar about the appointment of the next khalifah, he said: 'If one of two men were still alive I would charge him with the khilafah, and they are Salim the freed slave of Abu Hudayfa, and Abu Ubayda
al-Jarrah. For if Salim was still alive I would not have
designated a shura.'7
Also Abu Bakr told 'Abd ar-Rahman ibn Awf, while conversing
with him on his deathbed: 'I wish I had asked the Prophet of
Allah about the appointment of a successor so that nobody
________________________
6 Tarikh al-Yaqubi, 2/126-127.
7 Tabaqat ibn Sa'd, 3/248.
( 17 )
could have contested it!'8
Furthermore one of those present when the Ansar assembled at
as-Saqifa to appoint Sa`d ibn Ubada, said: 'If the Muhajirun
from Quraysh disagree they will say, "We are the Muhajirun and
we are his clan and his partisans." But some of the Ansar said,
"So we shall say, "We shall have a khalifah and you shall have a
khalifah. For we will never be content with anything other than
this!"'
When Abu Bakr spoke to them he said: 'We are the Muslims
and the Muhajirun who were the first to adopt Islam, and for
this reason the people must follow us, because we are the clan of
the Prophet of Allah and of pure Arab lineage.'
And when the Ansar suggested that the khilafah should alternate
between the Muhajirun and the Ansar, Abu Bakr rejected it,
saying: 'When the Prophet of Allah came to the Arabs they
found it difficult to leave the religion of their forefathers and
differed and disagreed with him, then Allah chose the first
Muhajirun to believe in him from his people, and they became
the first to worship Allah in this world, and were his partisans
and kinsfolk, who have the most right to rule after him, which
would only be disputed by the unjust.'
But Al-Habbab ibn al-Mundhir, who encouraged the people in
their determination, said: `Stand firmly in support of your claim,
for these people are under your care and protection, and if they
refuse we shall have a khalifah and they shall have one!'
So Umar replied and said: 'Impossible! Two swords cannot be
sheathed in one scabbard. So only the false claimant, the
deviant, or someone willing to risk his own destruction would
dispute with us concerning the rule of Muhammad and his
legacy, for we are his partisans and his clan.'9
If we wish to scrutinize this point we must take into consideration
________________________
8 Tarikh al-Tabari, 4/52.
9 See the texts concerning as-Saqifa in Sharh an-Nahj, 6/6-9.
( 18 )
the method of appointment used by the first and second
khulafah; the fact that this method was not rejected; the
prevalent atmosphere which surrounded the opposing factions
of the leading personalities of the Muhajirun and the Ansar on
the day of as-Saqifa; the obvious inclinations of the Muhajirun in
deciding that the authority should rest with them and not with
the Ansar; the emphasis which they placed upon the principle of
inheritance which gave the clan of the Prophet the most right to
succession; the willingness of many of the Ansar to accept the
idea of two khulafah - one of whom would be from the Ansar;
who won the khilafah on that day; and that he regretted not
having asked the Prophet about his successor.
In fact all this proves, without a shade of doubt, that this first
generation of the Islamic Ummah, which also included those
who came to power after the death of the Prophet, did not give
any thought to the concept of shura as regards the appointment
of the khilafah nor did they possess a clearly defined under
standing of its principles; so how can we believe that the Prophet
had instituted a policy of educating his followers concerning the
legal and theoretical concepts of shura, to prepare the Muhajirun
and the Ansar to submit the leadership of Islam to one elected
according to these principles, when we cannot find any actual
implementation of this method, or clear understanding thereof,
amongst this generation!
Similarly, we cannot believe that the Prophet set down this
method and its details legally and theoretically, but did not
attempt to familiarize and educate the Muslims in this respect.
This in fact proves the aforementioned theory that the Prophet
did not present the principle of shura to the Ummah as an
alternative to more traditional methods, because it is improbable
that such a principle could have been presented and then
disappeared completely from the reports of all sections of this
society.
Other obvious points which further illustrate this are as follows:
( 19 )
a) The principle of shura was a new one for this area, which had
not experienced any sort of highly developed government before
the time of the Prophet, and thus required extensive education
to acquaint its inhabitants as to its exact nature.
b) The shura as a concept was unclear and could not be
presented or put into action without its details, rules, and
guidelines for preference in the case of dispute being clarified.
Moreover, should these guidelines be based upon numbers and
quantities, or upon qualities and experience, or upon other
attributes which would facilitate the clarification of the concept
and render it immediately functional upon the death of the
Prophet?
c) In fact shura was an expression of the Ummah's implementation of authority according to consultation and the determination of the people concerning their government. The responsibility for this lay with all those who were involved in shura. If this shura was legally acceptable and to be put into practice immediately after the death of the Prophet, the majority of the
people should have been previously instructed concerning it, so
that each could adopt a positive attitude towards shura and bear
his share of the responsibility.
All these points prove that the Prophet had he wished that a
shura be set up to choose a successor after his death, would have
had to disseminate the concept of shura on a wide and profound
scale to prepare his followers psychologically and to fill any gaps
in their understanding, while also explaining the details which
would make it a workable concept. The presentation of this
concept on this level and wide scale could not have been carried
out by the Prophet and then disappear totally from the minds of
all the Muslims who were alive at the time of the Prophet's
death.
There is of course the possibility that the Prophet did in fact
present the concept of shura to its best advantage and on the
scale which circumstances required so that the Muslims understood
( 20 )
its nature, but that political motivations led to its
suppression so that the Muslims felt forced to hide what the
Prophet had already taught them about the rules and details of
shura. This theory is, however, impracticable because whatever
may be claimed about them, these motives could not have
influenced the ordinary Muslims from among the sahaba who
did not participate in the political events which took place
immediately after the death of the Prophet, or play an important
role in the gathering at as-Saqifa, but were rather on-lookers; for
such people represent a large percentage of every society
irrespective of the political forces therein.
If the concept of shura had been presented by the Prophet
according to the requirements of the society this would not have
been strictly for the ears of those who had political motives,
because many people would have heard about it and it would
naturally have been reflected in the actions of the ordinary
members of the sahaba, just as the prophetical ahadith concerning
the merits of Imam Ali and his designations were actually
reflected in the attitude of the sahaba themselves. Also why did
these political motives not prevent the ahadith concerning the
merits of Imam Ali, his designation and his rights to the
leadership from being handed down to us through the sahaba of
the Prophet, in spite of the fact that these contradicted the
prevalent attitudes of the time, when we possess no reports
concerning the concept of shura? In fact even those who
represented these prevalent attitudes often found themselves in
disagreement concerning political affairs, and would have found
it advantageous to uphold the idea of a shura in opposition to
the other faction. Yet none of these factions used this idea as a
precept which they had heard from the Prophet.
An example of this can be found in the position adopted by
Talha concerning Abu Bakr's appointment of Umar, and in his
denial of and obvious anger against this appointment, because,
in spite of his rejection, he did not seek to countermand this
appointment by calling for a shura, or to condemn Abu Bakr for
departing from the teachings of the Prophet concerning shura
( 21 )
and the election of a successor.
2. It is also clear that had the Prophet decided to entrust the first generation of Muslims, which included the Muhajirun and the
Ansar who were his contemporaries, with the guarding of Islam
after his death and with the responsibility for the continuation
of the task of transformation, he would have been obliged to
prepare this generation with an extensive ideological and
intellectual project so that they could grasp the concept firmly
and practice it according to their awareness thereof, and could
find solutions to the problems with which Islam would be
continually confronted. This is specially true when we consider
that the Prophet, who foretold the fall of Khusrow and Caesar,
knew that Islam was destined to win many victories, and that
the Islamic Ummah would, in the near future, include new
nations and cover a large area and would thus face the
responsibility of proselytizing Islam to these nations and
protecting the Ummah from the negative consequences of such
expansion, while also applying the legal rules upon the conquered
lands and their inhabitants.
In spite of the fact that the first generation of Muslims was the
purest ever to embrace Islam and the most prepared to sacrifice
for it, we cannot detect any indication of the specialized
preparation required to assume the guardianship of the faith,
nor of wide and profound instructions concerning its exact
nature. In fact the factors which illustrate this point are so
numerous that it is impossible to study them in this particular
work.
We can, however, point out in relation to this that the number
of texts which are reported from the Prophet by the sahaba in
the sphere of legislation only amounts to a few hundred ahadith,
while there were about 12,000 sahaba according to the history
books. Furthermore, the Prophet lived in a town with thousands
of them and prayed with them in the same masjid morning and
evening, so why can we not find some indication of specialized
preparation amongst these people?
( 22 )
It is well-known that the sahaba refrained from asking the
Prophet questions to the extent that all of them would wait until
a bedouin came from outside Medina to ask a question and then
listen to the Prophet's reply, because they considered a question
unnecessary if it concerned something that had not yet taken
place.
For this reason Umar once announced from the minbar: `By
Allah, man is forbidden to ask questions concerning what has
never existed, for indeed the Prophet clarified what is in
existence.'10 And he added: It is not permissible for one to ask
questions about what has never existed, for Allah has given His
judgment upon all things that exist.' Also a man came to
Umar's son one day and asked him about something and
Umar's son told him: `Do not ask about what has never existed
for I have heard Umar cursing one who asks regarding what has
never happened.'11 There was also a man who asked Ubayy ibn
Ka`b about a problem and he said: '0 my son, does this affair
which you asked me about exist?' He replied: 'No.' So the
former said: 'If that is the case, leave this question until it does
exist.'12
One day Umar was reading the Qur'an and came to the ayah:
`And We caused to grow therein seeds, vines, herbs, olive trees,
palms and gardens (which were) profuse, fruitful and verdant
(abban).'13 So someone said: 'We know all of this, but what is
abban?' Then Umar said: 'This, in the Name of Allah, is an
irrelevant question, and it is not important whether you know
the meaning of abban or not. Follow what is clear in the Book
and practise it, and leave what you do not know to Allah.'
We can thus discern that the sahaba tended to desist from
questions other than those concerning clearly defined and
existent problems. It was in fact this tendency that led to the
________________________
10 Swum ad-Darimi, 1/50.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Surat al-'Abasa, 28-32.
( 23 )
scarcity of legislative texts reported on the authority of the
Prophet and later necessitated the consultation of sources other
than the Qur'an and the Sunnah, such as legal discretion
(istihsan) and analogy (qiyas), and the other features of
independent judgment (ijtihad) which combine to form the
personal interpretation of the mujtahid, which can allow the
man's personality, his tastes and his personal understanding to
enter into the legislative act.
Such a tendency is, of course, diametrically opposed to the
process of personal and ideological preparation which would
have required the extensive education of this generation, while
also requiring that they be acquainted with the legal stipulations
concerning the problems which they would face when involved
in the leadership.
Just as the sahaba refrained from asking questions to the
Prophet they also chose not to record his ahadith in writing, in
spite of the fact that the ahadith constituted the second Islamic
source and that this was the only way to preserve it and prevent
distortion. Indeed, Al-Hirawi expressed openly his disparagement of the oral tradition on the authority of Yahya ibn Said from `Abd Allah ibn ad-Dinar, saying that neither the sahaba nor the next generation wrote down the ahadith but transmitted them orally and learnt them by heart, except for the book about
the alms tax (kitab as-sadaqat). In fact, according to the Tabaqat
of Ibn Sed, the second khalifah thought regarding the best
position to adopt concerning the Sunnah of the Prophet for a
whole month, but finally announced his prohibition of the
documentation thereof. Thus the Sunnah of the Prophet, which
was the most important Islamic source after AI-Qur'an al-Karim,
was destined to suffer arbitrarily from forgetfulness, distortion
and the death of those who had learnt the traditions by heart
(huffaz) for nearly 150 years.
The only exceptions to this were the Ahl al-Bayt who applied
themselves to the documented recording of ahadith from the
earliest period, and we know from the numerous ahadith
( 24 )
reported on the authority of the Imams of the Ahl al-Bays that
they possess a weighty book which had been dictated by the
Prophet of Allah and written by the hand of Ali ibn Abi Talib,
and which included all the Sunnah of the Prophet of Allah.
Do you, by Allah, believe that this naive group of people - if
they were in fact naive - who refrained from asking questions
about matters which had not yet occurred and forbade the
documentation of the Sunnah of the Prophet after he had
pronounced it were capable of guiding the new religion or of
leading it through the most important and difficult stages of its
long history? Or do you, by Allah, believe that the Prophet left
his Sunnah to posterity without ensuring its organization and
documentation, although he had commanded his followers to
practice it? Furthermore, had he really arranged for the concept
of a shura, would it not have been necessary to delineate its rules
and to organize his Sunnah, so that the shura could progress
according to a definite programme in which personal desires
would have no part to play? Or is it that the only rational
interpretation of this is that the Prophet had prepared Imam Ali
to assume the leadership after his death and entrusted him with
his complete Sunnah and taught him 1,000 types of knowledge?
In fact, the events which took place after the death of the
Prophet proved that the Muhajirun and the Ansar had not
received any sort of instruction concerning many of the
momentous problems which the da'wah had to face after the
time of the Prophet so that neither the khalifah nor the central
government who supported him had a clear idea as to how the
lands won by the Islamic conquests should be dealt with
according to the Shari' ah, whether these lands should be divided
amongst the fighting forces or should be regarded as endowments (auqaj) for the good of all Muslims. For it is surely
inconceivable that the Prophet assured the Muslims that they
would conquer the lands of Khusrow and Caesar and intended
that the Muhajirun and the Ansar should lead the da'wah and
handle the problems arising from these victories when he did
not acquaint them with the legal premises which were necessary
( 25 )
to control the large proportion of the world which was to come
under Islamic rule.
Indeed we can go even further and illustrate that the generation
which was contemporary to the Prophet did not even possess a
clearly defined picture of the religious matters which the
Prophet had practised hundreds of times within the sight and
hearing of the sahaba.
A good example of this is the case of the prayers said over a
dead man (salat al-mayyit), a practice which the Prophet had
carried out publicly on hundreds of occasions, performing it as
one of the funeral cortege with the funeral escort and those who
offered up prayers. Yet in spite of this, it appears that the sahaba
did not consider it necessary to note the form of this rite
carefully as long as the Prophet led the prayer, while they
followed him step by step. Because of this they fell into
disagreement after the death of the Prophet as to the number of
takbir (to say Allahu Akbar) repeated in the salat alamayyit.
At-Tahawi reported from Isma'iI saying:
'When the Prophet of Allah died, the people differed as to how
many takbir should be said over the bier. One man would say, '1
heard the Prophet of Allah say Allahu Akbar seven times."
While another said, "I heard the Prophet of Allah say Allahu
Akbar five times" and a third would say, "I heard the Prophet of
Allah say Allahu Akbar four times." So they differed openly
until the death of Abu Bakr and when Umar became khalifah
and perceived their disagreement he became grieved and sent for
one of the sahaba of the Prophet of Allah, and said, "You are
the sahaba of the Prophet of Allah! When you differ before the
people they shall differ after you, and when you agree upon a
matter the people shall agree upon it. So consider what you shall
agree upon." And it was as if he had awakened them. So they
replied, "It shall be as you wish, 0 Leader of the Faithful.'14
Thus we can see that the sahaba depended on the Prophet
________________________
14'Umdatul Qari.
( 26 )
during his lifetime and did not feel that it was immediately
necessary to study the rules and concepts closely as long as they
were under his protection.
You may think that the picture which has been painted of the
sahaba and of the points which illustrate their inability to rule
contradict our belief that the prophetical programme of
instruction achieved a high level of success and produced an
awesome and religious generation. In reply to this we must
point out that in studying the actual nature of the medial
generation who were the Prophet's contemporaries we have not
mentioned anything which would clash violently with the
positive appraisal of the prophetical instructions which he
applied during his noble life. Because, while we believe that the
prophetical instructions were a unique and divine example and
an outstanding religious revelation in the history of prophetical
acts, we have found that the belief in this and the attainment of
a fair appraisal of the outcome of these instructions does not
depend upon the observation of results without reference to the
circumstances which surrounded these instructions, nor upon
observations of quantity separated from those of quality. In
order to clarify this we shall cite the following example.
We shall assume that there is a teacher who is teaching a
number of students the English language and literature, and that
we want to assess his teaching potential. It is not sufficient
simply to scrutinize the students' standard of cultural knowledge
or their familiarity with the English language and its literature.
We must also take into consideration the time for which the
teacher has been teaching these students, their previous
experience, their proximity to or distance from the atmosphere
of the English language and literature, the size of the difficulties
and exceptional problems which confront the teaching process
and hinder its natural course, the targets which the teacher
aspired to when teaching the literature of this language to his
students, and the final outcome of the teaching process when
compared to many other types of instruction.
( 27 )
And when assessing the prophetical instructions we must take
into consideration the following points:
1) The short length of time in which the Prophet was actually
carrying out this plan of instruction, which did not exceed two
decades, as far as his earliest sahaba, who accompanied him at
the beginning of his mission were concerned, and did not exceed
a single decade for the vast majority of the Ansar, or three or
four years for the large number of converts to Islam from the
time of the Truce of al-Hudaybiyya until the Conquest of
Makkah.
2) The previous intellectual spiritual, religious and behavioural
environment in which these people lived before the Prophet
started his mission, and the empty simplicity and aimlessness
which confronted them in various spheres of their lives. I do not
think it necessary to illustrate this point further because it is
self-evident. Islam was not a superficial, reformatory process in
society, but was rather a radical and revolutionary process
aimed at the building of a new society, which implied a total
conceptual change in attitudes between the previous and new
environment, to which the Prophet directed all his efforts.
3) The events and political and military confrontations which
bedevilled that era on various different fronts and made the
relationship between the Prophet and his sahaba distinct from
that of a person like Prophet `Isa (Jesus) and his disciples, for
this relationship was not one of a teacher or instructor who
could devote his time totally to his students, but was in fact that
of a Prophet who was an instructor while also the military
leader and head of State.
4) The social and religious conflict which arose from close
contact with the Ahl al-Kitab (the People of the Book), and with
various different religious cultures, for this contact and the
opposition raised by those who opposed the new faith and were
educated according to older religious culture proved a source of
unrest and continual provocation. Indeed every one of us knows
( 28 )
that this resulted in the Jewish intellectual trend which was
infiltrated accidentally or purposely into the sphere of speculation, and a close scrutiny of AI-Qur'an al-Karim is enough to
illustrate the extent of the danger posed by the counter
revolution and the extensive involvement of revelation in
observing it and disputing its concepts.
5) The fact that the target which the Great Teacher was trying
to attain generally was, at this stage, the creation of a sound,
popular framework which would make it possible for the
leadership of the new message to interact with the Ummah and
be closely involved in its experiences, both during and after the
lifetime of the Prophet. But the target was not, at this stage, the
elevation of the Ummah to the level of leadership itself, as this
required complete understanding of Islam, comprehensive
knowledge of its rules and total awareness of its concepts. The
limitation of his target at this stage to the level which we have
mentioned was logical, because the nature of the process of
change dictated it. For it would have been illogical to conceive
this target other than within the bounds of possibility or within
the limitations which we have mentioned, considering the
circumstances faced by Islam at this time, and the ideological,
spiritual, intellectual and social differences between the new
religion and the prevalent corrupt reality of the era, which
would have made it impossible for the people to raise themselves
to the leadership of this religion after only one or two decades.
This point shall be examined further in the next paragraph, in
which we shall give proofs of the continued responsibility
involved as regards the new revolutionary experiment, which
was illustrated in the leadership of the Ahl al-Bays, so that the
khilafah of Imam Ali was actually dictated by the logical process
of change throughout the history of Islam.
6) The fact that a great many of the Ummah which was left by
the Prophet were Muslimat al-Fath, that is Muslims who
converted to Islam after the Conquest of Makkah and after the
new religion had become the most powerful political and
( 29 )
military force in the Arabian Peninsula. Naturally, the Prophet
was only destined to limited contact with them in the short time
left to him after the Conquest, and most of this contact was in
his capacity as ruler. Because of the stage through which the
Islamic State was passing the concept of Mu'allifa Qulubuhum
appeared, and in order to win over the hearts of people they
were given the right to receive zakat and other measures. Clearly
this section of the Ummah was not separated from the other, but
was an integral part thereof, influencing and being influenced at
the same time.
Thus, in the study of these six points, we have discovered that
the prophetical instructions were actually extremely successful
and brought about a singular transformation within the society,
while also producing a virtuous generation who were capable of
realizing the Prophet's aim as regards the creation of a sound,
popular foundation who could rally around the guiding leader
ship of the new experience and support it. Because of this we
also find that this generation was capable of performing its role
as the sound, popular foundation as long as mature and guiding
leadership was present in the person of the Prophet. Had this
leadership been allowed to take its divine course, this foundation
would have continued to play its correct part, although this does
not mean that it was actually ready to assume this leadership
itself, or to guide the new experience, because this would have
required greater spiritual and believing cohesion with Islam, and
a stronger and more extensive identification with its rules and
concepts and with the various aspects of its attitudes toward life,
while also necessitating a more intense elimination of the ranks
of the Ummah which included the munafiqun, the mundisun
(infiltrators) and the Mu'allifa Qulubuhum, who were still a
numerically and historically important part of this generation,
whose negative influences are indicated by the number of verses
in Al-Qur'an al-Karim in which especially the munafiqun, their
machinations and their position are mentioned. There were, of
course, some individuals from this generation whose high
( 30 )
religious attainments were formed by this instruction, as their
personalities fused in its melting pot, like Salman Farsi, Abu
Dharr, Ammar and many others.
But I would like to point out that the existence of these
individuals as part of this large generation does not prove that
this generation had, as whole, attained the level at which the
control of this momentous experience could be handed over to
them, according to the principle of shura. Indeed, even the
majority of these individual elites did not possess the religious
qualifications which would have made them capable of leading
the experience as regards its intellectual and cultural features, in
spite of their staunch loyalty and profound devotion, because
Islam is not an ideology made by man whose ideas could be
defined as a result of practical experience, or whose concepts
could be clarified as a result of devoted experimentation. It is
rather the message of Allah, whose rules and concepts had been
ordained and divinely increased with every piece of legislation
necessitated by experience, so the leadership needed to fully
comprehend its statutes and details, and study assiduously its
rules and concepts, otherwise it would be forced to rely upon
previous intellectual ideas and tribal connections, which would
lead to a break in the continuity of the experience, especially
when we remember that Islam was the last of the religions of the
heavens and must continue and surpass all temporal, regional
and national laws. It was thus impermissible that the leadership,
which would mould the foundations of this eternal religion,
should practise a series of mistakes and correct actions, in which
the mistakes would be accumulated over a period of time until
they formed a fatal flaw which could threaten the Islamic
experience with decline and destruction.
Everything that has gone before proves that the instructions
given by the Prophet to the Muhajirun and the Ansar did not
reach the level which would have been necessitated by the
conscious, intellectual and political preparation required to
guide the future path of the da'wah and the process of change
( 31 )
which had been instigated by the Prophet. It was, in fact, restricted to that required for a conscious, popular foundation which could rally to the leadership of the da'wah, both in the present and the future.
Each assumption which points to the belief that the Prophet intended that the support of the future experience and guardianship of the da'wah immediately after his death should be vested in the Muhajirun and the Ansar implicitly involves an indictment against the greatest and most discerning religious leader in the history of reformatory movements, because there was no clear distinction between the understanding necessary for the popular foundation of the da'wah and that necessary for the guidance of the da'wah or its intellectual and political leadership.
3. The da'wah was, of course, a reformatory process and a framework for a new way of life, charged with the task of building a new community and with uprooting all jahili principles and all their foundations.
The Islamic Ummah did not, as a whole, live in the shadow of this reformatory process for more than a single decade at the most, which is not usually long enough, according to the logic of ideological religions and reformatory beliefs, to raise a generation to the level of awareness and objectivity and freedom from the residue of past ideas, at which they can grasp the ideas of the new da'wah, and be capable of assuming the guardianship of the message, and handling the problems of this da'wah, while also continuing its reformatory process without a leader. In fact the logic of ideological religions makes it inevitable that the Ummah should continue under ideological trusteeship for a longer period of time, in which it could be raised to the level of guardianship itself.
This is not something which we have simply inferred, as it was also a fact substantiated by the events which took place after the death of the Prophet and became clear after half a century or less in the attempts of the Muhajirun and the Ansar to lead and
( 32 )
guard the da`wah. For, after less than a quarter of a century of this 'guardianship,' the khilafah of this generation and the religious experience resulting from its leadership were destroyed under the force of the heavy attacks made upon it by the former enemies of Islam, but this time from within rather than from without the Islamic experience. These enemies were able to infiltrate by degrees the weak points of this experience and take advantage of the inattentive leadership. Then they usurped this leadership insolently and violently and forced the Ummah and its original, pioneering generation to renounce its identity and its leadership, while the leadership itself turned into a line of hereditary kings, infatuated with prestige, who murdered the innocent, squandered wealth, neglected the rules of Islam, caused its laws to ossify, and fraudulently used the resources of the people. Thus the lands conquered by the Muslims became the gardens of Quraysh and the khilafah a toy of Banu Umayya.
So the true facts of the experience after the death of the Prophet and the results of this quarter century support the previous inference, which emphasized the support for guidance, and the intellectual and political leadership of the Muhajirun and Ansar immediately after the death of the Prophet was a premature step which was taken before its natural time. It is, however, illogical that the Prophet should have taken a step of this kind.